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National Wildlife Federation v. Watt: The
Property Clause and the Legislative Veto
I. Introduction
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha" the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a section 2 of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act3 under which Congress directly
intervened in executive administrative activity. Some months
later Congress issued a directive to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior (the Secretary) pursuant to a similar section" in the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).5 The direc-
tive forbade the Secretary's planned leasing of coal rights on
federally owned lands, known as the Fort Union Federal Coal
Production Region, in eastern Montana and western North
Dakota. The Secretary refused to obey the directive, taking
the position that Chadhae had rendered all congressional veto
clauses void and unconstitutional.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Watt,' the litigation
which followed, the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia suggested that the FLPMA clause was distinguishable
from the clause struck down in Chadha8 on the basis of its
Constitutional power source. The court stated that congres-
sional power over public lands, stemming from the Property
Clause of the Constitution,9 was greater than its legislative
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
3. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982).
4. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982).
5. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1982).
6. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
7. 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983).
8. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
9. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so con-
strued as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States or of any particular State.")
1
N.W.F. V. WATT
power, and that a congressional veto grounded in the Property
Clause might pass Constitutional muster where an article I
"legislative veto" could not.
In the end the district court did not decide the Constitu-
tional question which it raised in National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Watt.10 This Note will examine that question and re-
view the circumstances surrounding the creation and
evolution of the Property Clause, illustrating how the court's
reasoning is supported by the history of the clause.
II. Fort Union
Investigation and development of the Fort Union region's
possibilities for coal production began in the late 1970s under
the auspices of the Federal Coal Management Program. On
February 14, 1983 a Final Environmental Impact Statement
with regard to Fort Union was published. After balancing the
substantial negative environmental effects predicted by that
statement against the economic considerations involved, the
Secretary approved the leasing of rights to 790.2 million tons
of coal to be extracted from the region. The sale of the leases
was scheduled for September 14, 1983.11
On May 11, 1983, however, the federal government's Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) informed Congress that during
the previous year the Department of the Interior (DOI) had
auctioned off leases for over a billion tons of coal, on tracts
covering more than 30,000 acres of public land in Montana
and Wyoming, and had accepted in return 100 million dollars
less than GAO's estimate of the fair market value of the leases
involved. 112
In response to this report Congress enacted legislation,13
subsequently signed into law by President Reagan, which cre-
10. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1984).
11. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1149-52 (D.D.C. 1983).
12. Id. at 1152 (citing Comptroller General, Report to the Congress: Analysis of
the Powder River Basin Federal Coal Lease Sale: Economic Valuation Improvements
and Legislative Changes Needed (May 11, 1983)).
13. Act of July 30, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 328 (1983).
1984]
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss1/5
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
ated a commission to review DOI's coal leasing procedures. 14
This commission was to report to Congress in early 1984.15
Within days of this congressional action the Secretary in-
formed Congress that the sale of the Fort Union leases, sched-
uled for mid-September, would not be delayed. Congress had
requested that the sales be postponed until the commission
made its report.16
On August 3, 1983, the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs directed its chairman, Representative Morris
K. Udall, to notify the Secretary that an "emergency situation
existed, and that the Fort Union tracts 'are to be immediately
withdrawn' from availability for coal leasing." 7 Pursuant to
FLPMA15  section 204(e) e  and DOI's own regulation,20
promulgated to implement the statute, the Secretary was re-
quired to effect the withdrawal upon receipt of Representative
Udall's notification. The Secretary, however, informed the
House committee that he declined to follow their directive
since the Supreme Court's decision in Immigration & Natu-
14. During the same period Congress began slowly moving toward the enactment
of legislation which would declare a moratorium on all coal leasing pending the com-
mission's report. This legislation was subsequently enacted. See Act of November 4,
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-146, § 108, 97 Stat. 934 (1983).
15. See Off. of Technology Assessment, Environmental Protection in the Fed-
eral Coal Leasing Program 4 (May 24, 1984) (official analysis released subsequent to
the commission's first report to the Congress on February 17, 1984).
16. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. at 1152.
17. Id.
18. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1982).
19. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982):
When the Secretary determines, or when the Committee on Interior and In-
sular Affairs of either the House of Representatives or the Senate notifies the
Secretary, that an emergency situation exists and that extraordinary mea-
sures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost, the Sec-
retary notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (c)(1) and (d) of this
section, shall immediately make a withdrawal and file notice of such emer-
gency withdrawal with the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Such emergency withdrawal shall
be effective when made but shall last only for a period not to exceed three
years and may not be extended except under the provisions of subsection
(c)(1) or (d), whichever is applicable, and (b)(1) of this section. The informa-
tion required in subsection (c)(2) of this subsection shall be furnished the
committees within three months after filing such notice.
20. 43 C.F.R. § 2310.5 (1983).
3
N.W.F. V. WATT
ralization Service v. Chadha2 1 rendered both the statutory
provision and DOI's regulation void.22
In Chadha2 3 the Supreme Court had declared section
244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act2 4 unconsti-
tutional. Section 244(c)(2), like FLPMA 204(e), had permitted
one house of Congress to intervene, by resolution, in adminis-
trative activity. Under both sections Congress could require
the reversal of the decision of the head of an executive depart-
ment acting within the scope of his delegated authority.25
On September 8, 1983, the day before the Secretary made
his position officially known to the House committee, two en-
vironmental organizations, the National Wildlife Federation
and the Wilderness Society, initiated the law suit which is the
subject of this Note. They demanded a declaratory judgment
establishing the illegality of the Secretary's plan to lease Fort
Union coal rights in defiance of the committee's directive.
They also sought injunctive relief. Representative Udall, as
chairman of the committee whose resolution was to be disre-
garded, was permitted to intervene in the action.2
On September 16, 1983 the District Court for the District
of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order, preventing
the issuance of the contested leases. Subsequently, in granting
the petition for a preliminary injunction,27 the court found
that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of the
case, either on the basis of the Constitutional issue involved
or because of the Secretary's improper abandonment of DOI's
21. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
22. 571 F. Supp. at 1153 (citing Letter from Secretary James Watt to House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Chairman Morris K. Udall (Sept. 9, 1983)).
23. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). See generally McGuinn, The Demise of the Legisla-
tive Veto: The Struggle for Political Accountability: Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), 17 Creighton L. Rev. 915 (1983).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
25. If. . .either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution
stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the
Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary
departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided
by law .... Id.
26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
27. 571 F. Supp. at 1148.
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implementing regulation.28
By the court's own admission this initial litigation was
conducted in a deliberately hasty manner for economic rea-
sons, so that the Secretary might seek emergency appellate re-
view of the injunction prior to the end of the fiscal year.29
Contemplating this appellate consideration, the court's opin-
ion discussed the "delicate and original"30 question raised by
the impact of Chadhas' on the traditionally extensive power
of Congress under the Property Clause of the United States
Constitution.32 The Secretary, however, failed to seek appel-
late review, and in December of 1983 the parties moved for
summary judgment in the district court.33 Faced with the task
of making its own decision on the merits, the court opted for
the narrower ground of decision. It held that the Secretary
was bound to follow the DOI implementing regulation until
such time as the House committee withdrew its resolution or
the regulation had been properly rescinded3 4 in accordance
with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.35
The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment without resolving the Constitutional issue suggested by
28. Id. at 1158. See generally Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D.
Mont. 1982). The present case was not the first time the Secretary and the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs had been involved in litigation testing the
constitutionality of FLPMA 204(e). In Pacific Legal Foundation the Secretary had
withdrawn lands pursuant to committee resolution, and his action was challenged by
those interested in leasing the lands withdrawn. Although the Secretary's sympathies
were basically with the would-be lessees, the matter was fully litigated and FLPMA
204(e) was upheld as constitutional under a construction of the clause which gave the
Secretary final say on the duration of the withdrawal. In National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Watt the Secretary's position was that the construction of section 204(e) in Pacific
Legal Foundation was initially tortuous, and in any case obviated by the Supreme
Court decision in Chadha.
29. 571 F. Supp. at 1149 n.1.
30. Id. at 1158.
31. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
32. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
33. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 825, 827 (D.D.C. 1984).
34. Id. at 829.
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1982). Section 553(b) of the Act provides the minimum




its earlier opinion in the case:3 6 will the traditionally extensive
article IV power of Congress sustain the constitutionality of
FLPMA 204(e)3 7 when congressional power under article I
could not sustain a similar statutory provision in Chadha?8
III. FLPMA and the Legislative Veto
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act 9 is a
comprehensive statement of congressional intentions and di-
rectives governing the maintenance, use, and disposal of the
public lands of the United States. While acknowledging the
need to make use of natural resources found on and under
publicly owned property,4" the act, as part of its declaration of
policy, provides that:
. ..the public lands be managed in a manner that will
protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historic, ecological,
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and
archeological values; that, where appropriate, will pre-
serve and protect certain public lands in their natural
condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and
wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for
outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use. . ...'
Significantly, in light of the GAO report of May 11,
1983,42 the very next clause in the act demands that "the
United States receive fair market value of the use of public
lands and their resources unless otherwise provided for by
statute. . . .-3
In an effort to assure itself and the country at large that
these and other declared policies are adhered to by the ad-
ministrative officials of the executive branch, Congress re-
36. 577 F. Supp. at 827.
37. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982).
38. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
39. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982).
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(12) (1982).
41. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982).
42. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (1982).
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tained for itself the option of direct intervention in the imple-
mentation of its policies. Congress directly exercises its power
to intervene under section 204(e), which states:
When the Secretary determines, or when the Com-
mittee on Interior Affairs of either the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate notifies the Secretary, that an
emergency situation exists and that extraordinary mea-
sures must be taken to preserve values that would other-
wise be lost, the Secretary. . . shall immediately make a
withdrawal.. .. "I
Direct intervention clauses are commonly referred to as
legislative veto clauses. They have become familiar features in
congressional legislation over the past decade. 5
In environmental and energy-related areas of legislation
this device has been seized upon as a tool for opposing execu-
tive willingness to cooperate with financial interests which are
often at odds with naturalist concerns. Congress has used the
device in monitoring oil and gas lease bidding systems for off-
shore drilling rights.4 It has also retained the power to disap-
prove of rules promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce for
the management and exploitation of the nation's coastal ar-
eas. 47 Similarly, Congress has enacted statutory provisions
which allow it to oversee the activities of the Environmental
Protection Agency."
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982).
45. See Javits and Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 455 (1977); Bruff and Gellhorn, Congres-
sional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetos, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 1369 (1977).
46. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §
1337(a)(4)(a) (authorizing congressional disapproval of oil and gas lease bidding sys-
tems adopted by the Secretary of the Interior); 43 U.S.C. § 1354 (c) (allowing Con-
gress, by concurrent resolution, to contradict Presidential findings as to national in-
terest and to cause the cessation of oil and gas exports).
47. Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. § 1463(a)
(1982).
48. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of




In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,e
however, congressional activity pursuant to a similar statutory
provision 50 was overturned and the statutory section itself de-
clared unconstitutional. In that case the Immigration and
Naturalization Service had sought to deport Jagdish Chadha.
Conceding his deportable status, Chadha filed for a suspen-
sion of his deportation. This was granted by the Attorney
General pursuant to section 244(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.51 Congress overruled the Attorney General's
decision on the basis of section 244(c)(2) of the Act.2 Chadha
challenged the constitutionality of that action before his Im-
migration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals, both
of whom declined to rule on the constitutional question. Pur-
suant to section 106(a) of the Act5" Chadha next brought his
case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which pro-
nounced the section unconstitutional.5 4 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed.85
In deciding the case the Supreme Court acknowledged
the utility of the congressional veto but stated that mere util-
ity was not enough to save a statutory clause which violated
the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.56 It
held, therefore, that Congress could not avail itself of section
244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.5 7 It stated
that Congress, when acting in its legislative capacity, had to
comply with the Constitutional requirements of bicameral ac-
tion and presidential presentation.5
49. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1982).
54. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
55. 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (1983).
56. Id. at 2781. The Supreme Court stressed the limitations on congressional leg-
islative power, stating "explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution pre-
scribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the
legislative process."
57. Congressional power in the field of immigration is a legislative power, derived
from art. I, § 8, cl. 4 of the Constitution.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
1984]
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This was the rationale on which the Secretary relied 9
when he decided that it was permissible for him to ignore a
congressional directive pursuant to section 204(e) of the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act.6 It was the district
court's suggestion in National Wildlife Federation v. Watt,
however, that such reliance by the Secretary was misplaced
since Chadha dealt expressly with limitations on the legisla-
tive power of Congress under article I of the Constitution,
while congressional power over the management and disposal
of public lands is part of its article IV proprietary power.61
This proprietary power has historically been viewed as more
extensive and less easily circumscribed than congressional
power under article I.
IV. History and Development of the Proprietary Power
A. Creation
The central government of the United States, as it ex-
isted in early 1787, consisted solely of a congress, 62 in which
each state had one vote."3 This congress had been attempting,
with limited success, to provide for the common needs of the
several states since the early Revolutionary years. Most real
law-making, however, was carried on at the state level. Laws
enacted by state legislatures, affecting their relationships with
other states, were often contradictory and mutually destruc-
tive. Federal power to unify and harmonize these interrela-
tionships was virtually non-existent.6 ' The states, to a large
extent, acted as they wished, with or without the approval of
the national congress.
One extra-congressional state activity during that period
was the calling of interstate conventions to deal with common
problems. Such a convention was called for the summer of
1787. Its purpose was to discuss amendments to the Articles
59. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1153 (D.D.C. 1983).
60. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982).
61. 571 F. Supp. at 1157.
62. U.S. Articles of Confederation, art. V.
63. M. Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 3, 4 (1913).




of Confederation and to deal broadly with the problems of the
Union. 5
When this gathering, which we now know as the Constitu-
tional Convention, met in Philadelphia its most memorable
debates concerned the allocation of powers between the al-
ready existing (but soon to be restructured) congress and the
newly proposed executive and judicial branches." Also on the
agenda, however, was the question of how to balance the
needs and interests of the various states under the new
system.
At that time certain states were relinquishing previously
claimed western lands to federal control in return for federal
assumption of state war debts. Other states desired specific
assurances that once the ceding of those lands was completed
all would share equally in the fruits of their development.
Further, even while the convention was in session the congress
was considering a plan to eventually divide those newly ac-
quired lands, known as the Northwest Territory, into new
states.6
In light of this, the Philadelphia convention sought to de-
fine interstate and federal-state relationships in article IV of
its proposed constitution. It was deemed expedient, in this re-
gard, to provide the congress with "Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States."6 9 Fed-
eral supremacy in this area was intended to assure all states
that lands and property not belonging to any individual state
would be administered even-handedly, for the good of all. In
65. Farrand, supra note 63 at 8-10. One of the earliest of these conventions in-
volved Virginia, Maryland, and later Pennsylvania, and produced an agreement con-
cerning the navigation of the Chesapeake Bay. This led to the Annapolis Convention
of 1786, called to discuss commercial problems. All states were invited but only five
attended. The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was planned and announced at
Annapolis.
66. Id. at 68-112. The Virginia and New Jersey proposals, which formed the
center of the largest debate at the Constitutional convention, were chiefly concerned
with what were to become the first three articles of the Constitution.
67. 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 185-86 (1833).
68. Id. at 187.
69. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2..
1984]
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further assurance of equal treatment the following words were
added to the clause: "and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so construed as to Prejudice any Claim of the United States,
or of any particular State." 70
The Property Clause was originally intended to define the
relationship between the central government and the individ-
ual states. The division of power among the various branches
of that central authority was defined elsewhere. 7' As with the
rest of the Constitution, however, the applicability of the
Property Clause was not to be forever limited by the vision of
the framers. As time went on the power of Congress under
this clause began to impact on the authority of the other
branches of the federal government.
B. Evolution
By 1828 the Constitution was the long-time law of the
land, the acquisition and management of territory was one of
the chief concerns of the nation, and the singularly congres-
sional government of the Articles of Confederation was merely
a memory. American Insurance Company v. Canter72 de-
cided in that year, revealed, however, that the Property
Clause continued to afford Congress large and somewhat ex-
clusive power with regard to federal territory. In this case the
Supreme Court declined to overturn a decision by a Florida
territorial court. It held that territorial courts, established
through congressional power under the Property Clause of ar-
ticle IV, could not be contradicted by the highest federal
court.73
The same enhanced congressional authority was recog-
nized with regard to real property, as opposed to territorial
government, in United States v. Gratiot.74 In that decision,
which upheld the broad discretion of Congress with regard to
the leasing of public lands, the Supreme Court again acknowl-
70. Id.
71. U.S. Const. art. I (legislative), art. II (executive), art. III (judicial).
72. 26 U.S.(1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
73. Id. at 546.




edged the magnitude of the article IV power with the state-
ment that power over public lands "is vested in Congress
without limitation. '75
Congressional proprietary power received little further ju-
dicial exposition while the western United States was being
settled. During that time Congress used its power under the
Property Clause primarily to organize and govern territories
and to facilitate the opening of public lands for inexpensive
development and exploitation.7
With the closing of the frontier, however, issues involving
the Property Clause shifted focus, and cases construing the
clause began to deal more with the government's administra-
tion of public lands within existing state boundaries.
In the late 1800s congressional power under the Property
Clause acquired the name by which it is commonly called to-
day. In Camfield v. United States7 7 Congress was defined as
the "proprietor" of the public lands, whose powers under the
clause included not only those of a legislative body, but also
those of a common law owner, entitled to full judgment and
control over the use of its lands.7 8 Expanding on this theory,
United States v. City & County of San Francisco,79 in lan-
guage which recalled the original responsibility of Congress
under the clause - that of administering the public lands for
the common good - defined Congress as the "trustee" of the
public interest.80 Judicial review was held to be limited with
regard to the administration of that trust, and Congress was
said to have the power to "limit the disposition of the public
domain to a manner consistent with its views of public pol-
75. Id. at 537.
76. But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432-52 (1857). In
Dred Scott Chief Justice Roger Taney rejected the expansive view of congressional
power under the Property Clause. He described the clause as pertaining only to the
territory and property owned by the states in common at the time of their adoption
of the Constitution, and stated that congressional power over subsequently acquired
territory was implied by other sections of the Constitution.
77. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
78. Id. at 524. See also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911); United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915).
79. 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
80. Id. at 28.
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icy."81 In United States v. California82 the Supreme Court
stated, "We have said that the constitutional power of Con-
gress in this respect is without limitation .... Thus neither
the courts nor the executive agencies could proceed contrary
to an Act of Congress in this congressional area of national
power. '83
More recently in Alabama v. Texas84 the Court again de-
scribed the proprietary power as being possessed by Congress
in addition to its legislative power.88 In its most recent major
pronouncement on the Property Clause, Kleppe v. New Mex-
ico,8" the Supreme Court suggested the possibility of further
permutations of congressional power in the area of public land
management by stating "And while the furthest reaches of the
power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been defi-
nitely resolved, we have repeatedly observed that '[tihe power
over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without
limitations.' "87 In Kleppe the Supreme Court again affirmed
the expansive and dynamic nature of the proprietary power.8
C. Discussion
The congressional power circumscribed in Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadhas' is defined by the Supreme
81. Id. at 30. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act makes present con-
gressional policy with regard to public lands abundantly clear. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
82. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
83. Id. at 27.
84. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
85. Id. at 273 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474
(1915)).
86. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
87. Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310
U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
88. See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-40 (1936) (holding that the
definition of "property" under the clause included electrical energy as well as the real
property on which it was produced, and that congressional power extended to the sale
of that energy); Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that congressional acts under the Property Clause may preempt local
laws, and describing attempts to limit the proprietary power as "frivolous"in light of
Kleppe v. New Mexico).




Court as the article I legislative power.90 In National Wildlife
Federation v. Watt91 the district court suggested, without de-
ciding, that the article IV proprietary power was large and
distinct enough to sustain a congressional veto clause in the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, even in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha. The evolution of
the Property Clause demonstrates that there is ample support
for the court's theory.
It is true that the clause was created primarily for the
purpose of establishing the power of the federal government
over local authorities in the management of public lands and
territories, and that it has continued to perform that function
throughout its history. The Property Clause has exhibited,
however, a dynamic quality since its creation. It has demon-
strated an ability to sustain congressional activity whenever
such activity has been challenged. Reflecting this dynamism,
language in major twentieth century Supreme Court decisions
on the reach of the clause suggests a willingness to further
extend the power of Congress under the clause should con-
gressional policy so require.
The concept of the separation of powers upon which the
Supreme Court rested its decision in Chadha does not divide
the government of the United States into air-tight compart-
ments.92 In certain areas one branch has taken on the aspects
and activities of another. The executive branch, for example,
has developed an expanded role in international and military
affairs. Here it exercises powers and makes decisions which
would normally be left to the legislature if strict separation of
powers principles were applied. The Supreme Court, for rea-
sons of policy and tradition, has not chosen to enforce these
principles strictly, and has often held itself to a limited review
of executive actions in this area. 3
Similarly, the Supreme Court has shown a consistent un-
90. See supra, notes 55-57; and accompanying text.
91. 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1156-57 (D.D.C. 1983).
92. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1975); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US.579, 635 (1952) (Jackson J., concurring); Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
93. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936).
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willingness to prohibit Congress from enabling and enforcing
its land management policies through legislation. As a result,
congressional activity under the Property Clause has also been
accorded a large measure of judicial deference. The concept of
limited review of congressional activity saw an early manifes-
tation in American Insurance Company v. Canter.'4 Respect
for congressional power has continued to guide the Supreme
Court's determination of cases arising under the clause as the
circumstances involved in those cases changed,"8 and it re-
mains an important aspect of the proprietary power today.'6
Historic deference to the executive branch in interna-
tional affairs supports the Supreme Court's decision in
Chadha,'7 because decisions on immigration and deportation
often have international ramifications and effects. They are,
therefore, the appropriate province of an unimpeded execu-
tive. Such considerations are not present in the area of public
land management. Decisions in this sphere have been left to
Congress and its policies have traditionally governed the dis-
position of public lands. 8 The statutory section at issue in
National Wildlife Federation v. Watt is part of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act. The title of that legisla-
tion and its substantive sections leave little doubt as to the
existence and content of congressional policies.
Finally, the need for enforceable congressional control in
this area is made clear by the circumstances which led to the
litigation in National Wildlife Federation v. Watt. The con-
centration of total administrative power in the hands of soli-
tary executive officials allows those officials to easily under-
mine the stated policies and programs of Congress. In the area
of public land management such a frustration of congressional
94. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
95. See Downes v. Bidiwell, 182 U.S. 244, 263-71 (1901).
96. See United States v. Husband R., 453 F.2d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that a territorial governor to whom Congress delegated its proprietary power was
not limited by Commerce Clause restrictions as a state government would be in en-
acting local legislation); Guam v. Okada, 694 F.2d 565, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that all judicial authority in the Territory of Guam derives from its congressional
enabling act under the Property Clause).
97. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
98. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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authority is without precedent and contrary to the traditional
construction of the Property Clause.
V. Conclusion
The anticipated clash between the congressional proprie-
tary power and the Supreme Court's condemnation of the leg-
islative veto was avoided in National Wildlife Federation v.
Watt. The potential for such a confrontation, however, re-
mains. It is difficult to predict the course of future decisions
in the land use area during times of economic upheaval and
dwindling resources. History, however, supports the theory
enunciated by the district court in its initial opinion in this
litigation. The largely uninterrupted judicial elevation of the
article IV proprietary power indicates that when the Constitu-
tional issue discussed in National Wildlife Federation v.
Watt becomes a reality, federal courts should and will con-
tinue their historic deference to Congress in this area, and af-
ford that body the tools it deems appropriate for the mainte-
nance of public property. Deriving its authority from a
distinct and traditionally more potent power source in the
Constitution, Congress should see its "proprietary veto" sur-
vive where its legislative veto could not.
Michael Latini
1984]
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss1/5
